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SOME OPINIONS ON THE OPINION CLAUSE
Akhil Reed Amar*
The President... may require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any
Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.
U. S. Constitution Article II, Section 2
rHIS Essay explores one of the least discussed but most
I intriguing clauses of the United States Constitution. When
closely parsed, the words of the Article II Opinion Clause yield
rich insights into the scope, limits, and nature of the American
Presidency, with implications both timely and timeless.
In a nutshell, the Opinion Clause was designed to clarify the
role of a new and distinctly American idea of a President, who
would be measurably less than an English-style King, but
measurably more than an English-style Prime Minister. Unlike
a King, the American President could not compel judicial and
legislative leaders to serve as his Privy Council; and unlike a
Prime Minister, a President would not merely stand as first
among equals in an Executive Cabinet. With the Opinion
Clause, the Framers rejected a committee-style Executive
Branch in favor of a unitary and accountable President, standing
under law, yet over Cabinet officers. 1
I. THE CLAUSE (AND THE CONSTITUTION) AS A WHOLE
Before we closely examine individual words and phrases of the
Opinion Clause, and ponder their significance, let us consider
the clause as a whole. At first, it may seem downright trivial,
"Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School. This Essay was inspired by the work of
my friend Steven Calabresi.
I In Jed Rubenfeld's terminology, I claim that Privy Councils and committee-style
Cabinets form the "paradigm case" of the "particular evils ... felt to be
intolerable"-the "core evils that demanded a constitutional transformation"-in the
drafting of Article II. Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 Yale
Li. 1119, 1169-73 (1995). But cf. id. at 1173 (distinguishing between rights and powers
for constitutional interpretation on Rubenfeld's "model of writing"). On my account,
Article II, best read, both empowers and limits.
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indeed redundant. Alexander Hamilton appears to have thought
so in The Federalist Papers, where he devoted exactly one
sentence of explicit analysis to the clause: "This I consider as a
mere redundancy in the plan, as the right for which it provides
would result of itself from the office." 2
Some modem critics-including Michael Froomkin, Larry
Lessig, and Cass Sunstein-have pounced on this logic. 3
According to the critics, if a given reading of the Constitution as
a whole, and of Article 1's other clauses, ends up rendering the
Opinion Clause (or, presumably, any other clause) redundant,
that redundancy is itself a very strong reason for rejecting the
given reading; each clause must add something new.
But it is the critics, and not Hamiltonians, who err in their
interpretive premises. Even a casual look at the Constitution
reveals clauses that are in some sense redundant or superfluous. 4
In two separate Federalist Papers, Publius reminds his readers
that the Article I, Section 8 Necessary and Proper Clause does
not add any real power to the federal government above and
beyond the powers explicit or implicit in the earlier Section 8
menu; rather the clause was added merely "for greater caution"'5
to explicitly affirm what otherwise would have been the best
reading "by unavoidable implication.'6 Though often misread,
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland7
echoes this interpretive logic. He does not try to prove that the
2 The Federalist No. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
As we shall see, in an earlier Paper, Hamilton had already expounded on the
unwisdom of a committee-style Executive Council, whose rejection lay at the heart of
the Opinion Clause. See infra Part V.
3 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 8 n.21, 13, 32-38, 48, 72, 119 (1994); Morton
Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative Over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The
Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory of the Unitary Executive,
57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 627, 689 (1989); A. Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of
Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96 Yale L.J. 787, 800-801 & n.72 (1987)
[hereinafter Froomkin Note]. For a similar view, see Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 640-41 & n.9 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
4 For a similar analysis, see Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash,
The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 577, 585 (1994)
[hereinafter Calabresi & Prakash].
5 The Federalist No. 33, at 203 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
6 Id. No. 44, at 285 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
7 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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clause actually expands Congress's powers, but only that it does
not shrink them.8 For Marshall, even if the clause neither
enlarges nor restricts-and thus is in some sense redundant-it
nonetheless serves a sensible purpose, by "remov[ing] all
doubts" about what would otherwise be left to implication.9
So too, a goodly portion of our Bill of Rights is re-
dundant-and was so understood by its drafters, who explicitly
described their Bill as a set of "declaratory" and "restrictive"
provisions. 10 Even without the words of the First Amendment,
most leading Federalists conceded that Congress lacked Article
I enumerated power to censor opposition speech" or regulate
religion in the states.'2 And beyond the logic of federalism, the
unamended Constitution's overall logic of republican
8 Id. at 413, 419-20. See also Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in
Constitutional Law 14 (1969) (discussing this aspect of Marshall's opinion).
9 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 420-21.
10 2 Documentary History of the Constitution of the United States of America 321
(1894) (emphasis added). See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1154 & n.109 (1991) (arguing that many Bill of
Rights provisions were declaratory measures inserted to confirm preexisting
constitutional understandings).
11 See, e.g., 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 617-18 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter Farrand] (Roger Sherman at Philadelphia
convention); 2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 449, 468 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter Elliot's
Debates] (James Wilson at Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 3 id. at 203, 469
(Edmund Randolph at Virginia ratifying convention); 4 id. at 208-09 (Richard Dobbs
Spaight at North Carolina ratifying convention); id. at 259-60 (Charles Pinckney at
South Carolina ratifying convention); id. at 315 (Charles Cotesworth Pinckney at
South Carolina ratifying convention); The Federalist No. 84, at 513-14 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); A Citizen of New Haven, II in Essays on the
Constitution of the United States 237, 239 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, Burt
Franklin 1892) [hereinafter Essays] (Roger Sherman); The Landholder, VI in id. at
161, 164 (Oliver Ellsworth); Remarks on the New Plan of Government, in id. at 395,
398 (Hugh Williamson); Observations on George Mason's Objections to the Federal
Constitution, in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States 333, 360-61 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., New York, Burt Franklin 1888) (James Iredell); An Examination
Into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution in id. at 25, 48 (Noah
Webster).
12 See, e.g., 2 Elliot's Debates, supra note 11, at 455 (James Wilson at Pennsylvania
ratifying convention); 3 id. at 93, 204, 330, 469 (James Madison and Edmund
Randolph at Virginia ratifying convention); 4 id. at 194-95, 208 (James Iredell and
Richard Dobbs Spaight at North Carolina ratifying convention); The Landholder, VI
in Essays, supra note 11, at 164; 2 The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 1088
(Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971) [hereinafter Schwartz] (Roger Sherman at First
Congress, August 15, 1789).
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government and popular sovereignty sharply limited the
authority of the People's agents in Congress to regulate the
People's speech. 13 As Madison put the point in 1794: "If we
advert to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find
that the censorial power is in the people over the Government,
and not in the Government over the people."'1 4 If we take
seriously the letter and spirit of the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause, many of the remaining clauses of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments are in some sense redundant. After all,
these clauses-implicating grand juries, double jeopardy,
confrontation, compulsory process, counsel, and so on-simply
make explicit fair-trial rules implicit in the general idea of due
process. 5 Under the Constitution's logic of popular sovereignty,
We the People retain and reserve certain rights even in the
absence of the specific reminders of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. The Tenth Amendment's additional affirmations
of proper principles of federalism-of powers retained by states
and denied to Congress-are also redundant, as Madison himself
was the first to concede in the First Congress: "Perhaps words
which may define this more precisely than the whole of the
instrument now does, may be considered as superfluous. I admit
they may be deemed unnecessary."16
But if all this is so, what are we to make of the oft-repeated
maxim against redundancy? Just this: It is one permissible
maxim of commonsensical interpretation, to be applied
sensitively and contextually to aid sound construction, not some
rigid and technical rule that must be followed even where it
defeats common sense and interpretive aesthetics. 7 Certain
13 See Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the
People 101-24 (1960); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 1193, 1266-67 (1992). See also Black, supra note 8, at 35-
50 (focusing on the structural need to protect speech from state as well as federal
censorship).
14 4 Annals of Cong. 934 (1794) [hereinafter Annals].
Is See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 Geo. L.J.
641 (1996).
16 2 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 1033 (June 8, 1789).
17 For a sensible application of the anti-redundancy maxim, consider the question
whether the general language of Article I, Section 9 applies equally to states and the
federal government. If so, then the Section 9 command that "No Bill of Attainder or
ex post facto Law shall be passed," limits states as well as Congress-but then what
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clauses in a well-drafted Constitution may indeed be redundant
in the sense that they are the textual embodiments of the best
reading of the document's overall structure and meaning. Why
put redundant texts into a well-drafted Constitution? In part to
clarify and exemplify the best reading of structure, which might
otherwise be ambiguous. This clarifying and exemplifying role
is especially vital in Article II, which opens with a sweeping and
somewhat ambiguous clause vesting "The executive Power" in
the President, 18 and yet nowhere exhaustively defines the
contours of "executive Power."' 9 (Article I, by contrast, vests
Congress only with legislative powers "herein granted" and
painstakingly enumerated in Article I, Section 8.20 Similarly,
Article III vests "the judicial Power" in federal courts, and then
proceeds to define with precision the nine categories of "Cases"
are we to make of the parallel language in Section 10: "No state shall.., pass any Bill
of Attainder, [or] ex post facto Law .... ." If Section 9 applies to states, the repetition
in Section 10 would be horribly and unstylishly redundant-eligible for inclusion in the
department of redundancy department. To save the Constitution from this kind of
inference of poor drafting, we properly construe Section 9 as applying only to the
federal government. This construction explains why the Section 9 bans are separated
from those of Section 10, which deals only with bans on states. (Here sound textual
analysis converges with a structural analysis based on the section-by-section
organization of the overall document. For similar interpretive approaches, see Barron
v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 248 (1833); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 419-20 (1819)).
18 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America.").
19 For much more analysis of the Vesting Clause, and the ways in which later clauses
clarify and exemplify the otherwise ambiguous contours of the power granted by the
Vesting Clause itself, see Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants,
88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1377 (1994) [hereinafter Calabresi]; Calabresi & Prakash, supra
note 4, at 570-81; Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1175-81,
1194-98 (1992) [hereinafter Calabresi & Rhodes]. See also Akhil Reed Amar & Neal
Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases,
108 Harv. L. Rev. 701, 702,707,713-15 (1995) (deducing Presidential immunities from
the broad and somewhat ill-defined text of the Article II Vesting Clause, as
illuminated by other clauses in the Constitution). Contrary to the suggestions of
Professors Lessig and Sunstein, both Hamilton and Madison relied prominently on the
Article II Vesting Clause as a major font of executive power. Compare Lessig &
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 28,49, with Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the
Chief Administrator: The Framers and the President's Administrative Powers, 102
Yale LJ. 991, 995-96, 1001 (1993) [hereinafter Prakash Note].
20 U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
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and "Controversies" to which that very same "judicial Power"
"shall extend. ")21
The opening clauses of Article II, Section 2 do indeed
exemplify and clarify the President's role and powers. If a clause
should be read by the company it keeps, the Opinion Clause
merits careful attention: it is one of only three opening clauses
of this Section, which contains the Constitution's first
elaboration of executive power.22 In this weighty opening
wedge, the Opinion Clause is tightly flanked by two of the most
important clauses in Article II, the Commander-in-Chief and
Pardon Clauses:
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United
States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal
Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any
Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and
he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offences against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment.23
Together, these three introductory clauses place the President at
the apex of three awesome pyramids of power-as Chief
Military and Naval Commander, as Chief Administrator of the
Executive Bureaucracy, and as Chief Prosecutor, Executioner
and Dispenser of Mercy.
This opening triad, on its face, speaks to the President
alone-defining his basic status-preceding enumerations of
shared powers with Congress (treaties and appointments) in the
remaining paragraphs of Section 2. A handful of more limited
21 Id. at art. III, §§ 1, 2. For more discussion of the various vesting clauses, see
Calabresi, supra note 19; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 570-76; Calabresi &
Rhodes, supra note 19, at 1175-81, 1194-99; Prakash Note, supra note 19, at 995-96.
For more discussion of the Article III Vesting Clause and its tight linkage with the
Extension Clause, see generally Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article
III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205,231-33,238-
39 & n.118 (1985); Akhil Reed Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated:
A Reply, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1651, 1652 n.9 (1990).
22 Article I, of course, earlier vests the President with the weighty power of a
(defeasible) veto; but this is of course a kind of legislative power-hence its placement
in Article I-rather than "executive Power" as such. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.
23 Id. at art. II, § 2.
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rights and duties of the President are then set out more
specifically in a catchall paragraph in Section 324 (treated in a
single cursory paragraph in The Federalist No. 77).25
Even as the sole apex of awesome powers in this opening triad,
however, the President appears as a limited figure-as a
Generalissimo, CEO, and Executioner under law. He commands
the militia only when called into actual service-otherwise they
belong to the states (a federalism limit),2 6 and they may be
called up only pursuant to a Congressional law (a separation of
powers limit).27 As Chief Prosecutor, the President oversees
only prosecutions for offenses "against the United States" (a
federalism limit), but not federal impeachment prosecutions,
which are instead vested in the House of Representatives (a
separation of powers limit).28 So too, the Opinion Clause
features federalism limits-the President cannot demand reports
from state governors-and separation of powers limits, as we
shall see.
Let us look carefully at what kind of Presidency the Opinion
Clause, by its scope and its limits, seems to exemplify. To
squeeze as much juice as possible out of one small clause, we
shall in turn (but not in order) isolate various words and
phrases,2 9 and ponder both their explicit positive affirmations
and their possible negative implications.30
24 This catchall paragraph includes clauses concerning Presidential state of the union
messages, Presidential recommendations to the Congress, Presidential power to
convene and adjourn Congress, the Presidential role in receiving ambassadors, the
President's right/duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and Presidential
power to commission officers. Id. at art. II, § 3.
25 See The Federalist No. 77, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
26 See Amar, supra note 10, at 1168-73; Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 Yale LJ. 1425, 1495-1500 (1987).
27 U.S. Const art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 15 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To provide
for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections
and repel Invasions").
28 Id. at § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole Power of
Impeachment.").
29 For a similar organizational strategy, see Akhil Reed Amar & Ren6e B. Lettow,
Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 857
(1995).
30 As shall become clear, I embrace some negative implications, but not others. Like
the anti-redundancy maxim, the expressio unius maxim of inference by negative
implication must be applied sensitively and contextually; sometimes a negative
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II. "RELATING TO THE DUTIES OF THEIR... OFFICES": THE
ANTI-ROYALTY PRINCIPLE
Though awesome in his powers, the President is not a King.31
The Constitution requires a separation between the President as
a private person and the President as a public officeholder. In
England, the Monarchy was not characterized by such a strong
separation. Sir William Blackstone, as Solicitor to the Queen,
could be ordered to attend to the Queen's private business-her
lands, financial dealings and so forth.32 So too, as Blackstone
himself noted, the English King could demand advice from his
Privy Counsellors on virtually any matter he pleased: the
Counsellor's "duty" was to "advise for the king's honour" and
to serve "his sovereign lord. ' 33 But an American President
should not use executive departments to oversee his private
business affairs; Bill Clinton may not require Janet Reno to
prepare his tax returns. This basic structural postulate-that the
"executive Power" vested in Article II is not regal power-is
neatly exemplified by the closing words of the Opinion Clause,
implicitly (by expressio unius)34 limiting the President to seeking
advice from Cabinet officers in their public capacity, relating to
the public duties of their offices.35
implication makes the most sense of a clause, sometimes not. See Amar & Katyal,
supra note 19, at 702-08 & n.6. For an earlier and classic exposition making the same
point, with lovely examples, see The Federalist No. 83, at 495-97 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
31 This is, of course, a major theme of Hamilton's Federalist Papers on the
Presidency, especially in The Federalist Nos. 67 and 69. See also Calabresi, supra note
19, at 1392-93 (distinguishing between "executive" power of American President and
"regal" power of English King); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 577-78 (similar);
Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 19, at 1196-97 & nn.217-19 (similar).
32See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 212-13 (Stanley
N. Katz ed., University of Chicago Press 1979) (1765) [hereinafter Blackstone]
(discussing the Queen's ability to purchase and convey lands, and grant copyholds and
leases without the intervention of the King).
33 Id. at 223.
34 See supra note 30.
35 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 585, 634. Congress may of course provide
for personal staff for the President-to cook his meals, and so on. It can also provide
for "personal counsel" at public expense. Accordingly, the White House counsel may
well advise the President on his taxes. But of course the White House counsel is not
a "principal Officer" within the meaning of the Opinion Clause. See infra Part VI.
The Attorney General is such a principal officer-that is why, for example, she is
subject to Senate confirmation but the White House counsel is not. Query whether
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But the very need to separate the President's private business
from his public business may call for two sets of advisors-one
on the public payroll, one not-who may need to meet together
precisely in order to draw a sensible line between their proper
roles, and address both gray areas of ambiguous authority and
areas of overlapping responsibility. There is nothing inherently
sinister about such meetings-on the contrary they are
indispensable to a proper Presidency. For example, it may be
wholly proper for the President's private tax lawyer to brief his
public press secretary about the President's tax returns, in light
of questions that the press and the public may legitimately ask
the press secretary about those returns.3 6  Conversely, the
President may at times want his private lawyers to be briefed
about the public policies of his administration. For example, he
may want his private tax advisor not to take aggressive positions
on open tax questions-positions that, though perfectly
defensible in court (and perhaps even winners), may contradict
the formal position his I.R.S. Commissioner has taken, or will
soon take, in litigation reflecting the public policies of his
administration.
The Opinion Clause-though often overlooked-may thus help
us to understand better the constitutional principles underlying
the famous November 5, 1993 Whitewater meeting of the
President's public and private lawyers.
III. "EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS": THE COORDNACY
PRINCIPLE
Structurally, the President may not treat the Constitution's
other two co-equal branches as his inferiors.37 Textually, in the
Opinion Clause he has no explicit right to demand reports from
coordinate branches akin to his right to demand reports from
salaries paid to personal staff should be seen as a Presidential "Compensation" or
"Emolument" that, under Article II, § 1, cl. 7, may not be increased or decreased
within a Presidential term.
3 See Memorandum, Submission of the White House to the Special Senate
Committee Regarding Whitewater and Related Matters 4-11 (December 12,1995) (on
file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
3" See The Federalist No. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("The several departments being perfectly coordinate by the terms of their common
commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to ... [a] superior right").
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"executive Departments." (Of course, coordinate branches may
nonetheless be free to offer their opinions to him-that is a
different question.)
Here too, the Opinion Clause sharply distinguishes the
American Presidency from the English Monarchy. In England,
the judicial power had sprouted as an offshoot of executive
power, doing justice in the name of the King (as in the "Court
of King's Bench" and so on).38 Judges customarily sat on the
King's Privy Council, and thus were obliged to offer any advice
the King might seek. One proposed version of Article II in the
Philadelphia convention had likewise vested the President with
a right to demand "advice" from a "Privy-Council" that included
"the Chief-Justice of the Supreme-Court,"39 but this proposal
ultimately gave way to an Opinion Clause explicitly limited to
heads of "executive Departments. 40 Though the details of this
shift remain sketchy, the convention had earlier and repeatedly
rejected schemes to blend judges and the President together in
a "Council of Revision" that would collectively wield the veto
power.41 Unsurprisingly, Chief Justice John Jay and his brethren
explicitly invoked the negative implications 42 of the Opinion
Clause when, in 1793, they politely but firmly declined to offer
legal advice to President George Washington as a kind of
informal Kitchen Cabinet. In the words of the Justices: "[T]he
three departments of the government .... [are] in certain
respects checks upon each other, and.., the power given by the
Constitution to the President, of calling on the heads of
departments for opinions, seems to have been purposely as well
as expressly united to the executive departments." 43 Thus, under
38 1 Blackstone, supra note 32, at 222; Observations on George Mason's Objections
to the Federal Constitution, supra note 11, at 345-46; Gordon S. Wood, The Creation
of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 159 (1969).
39 2 Farrand, supra note 11, at 367. For earlier formulations of this proposal, see id.
at 328-29, 342-44.
40 See id. at 495, 541-43.
41 See 1 id. at 97-104, 138-40; 2 id. at 73-80. The reasons underlying this rejection
strongly support the vision of a unitary and thus visibly accountable President. See
infra Part V.
42 See supra note 30. See also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 628-29
(discussing negative implications of the word "executive" in the Opinion Clause);
Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 19, at 1184-85 & n.160 (similar).
43 Correspondence of the Justices (1793) reprinted in Paul M. Bator et al., Hart &
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this clause, coordinate branches of government stand in sharp
contrast to executive departments that are inferior to the
President, and do answer and report to him.
Coordinacy, of course, works both ways, structurally speaking.
Just as the President may not command other branches, he in
turn is not generally subject to their command. In other words,
he may not be treated like a legislative staff member or a law
clerk. Congress by law may impose certain reporting require-
ments, but such laws obviously require Presidential presentment.
Bona fide impeachment investigations may generate broad
subpoena power in the House, and (later-after the House
formally impeaches) in the Senate. But neither a single Senator
or Representative, nor a single House, nor the entire Congress
acting by joint resolution (without presentment) has a right to
demand a Presidential report on any matter whatsoever.
Similarly, judges may invite the Solicitor General to give them
the benefit of the administration's views, but judges generally
may not conscript the Executive Branch to offer legal advice on
any issue before the court, unless the United States is a party to
the case at hand.44
The notion that Congress lacks power to demand reports at
will from the President derives some support from the structural
principle of coordinacy, but also from the pointed absence of any
Opinion Clause of Article I vesting Congress with the right to
require the opinion of the President on any subject relating to
his duties. At least on occasion, Congress seems to have
accepted limits imposed by the coordinacy principle. As the
House Judiciary Committee put the point in 1879:
The Executive is as independent of either house of Congress as
either house of Congress is independent of him, and they
cannot call for the records of his actions, or the action of his
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 66-67 (3rd ed. 1988).
44Compare the anti-conscription principle in the federalism context laid down by
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). On the analogy between federalism
and separation of powers, see The Federalist No. 51, at 321-23 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
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officers against his consent, any more than he can call for any
of the journals or records of the House or Senate.45
Perhaps the best textual illustration of coordinacy in the
reporting and opining contexts comes from the State of the
Union Clause, which exemplifies a meeting of equals,
somewhere between a Presidential right and a Presidential duty:
"He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of
the State of the Union."46 The Veto Clause has a similar ring of
coordinacy rather than hierarchy in the giving and receiving of
opinions: a President should return a vetoed bill "with his
Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who
shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed
to reconsider" the bill.47
IV. "THE PRESIDENT... MAY REQUIRE": THE CHIEF
ADMINISTRATOR PRINCIPLE48
In sharp contrast to the State of the Union Clause, the Opinion
Clause does not exemplify a meeting of equals. Executive
departments are part of, well.., the Executive, whose power is
vested, under the emphatic opening words of Article II, in the
President. Executive departments are accountable to the Chief
Executive. The President does not-and cannot-execute all
laws himself with his own hands, but he is both empowered and
obliged to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" by
his underlings.49 As George Washington himself explained: "The
45 H.R. Rep. 141, 45th Cong., 3d Sess. (1879), quoted in Presidential Immunity From
Civil Liability, The N.Y. Litigator, Nov. 1995, at 31.
46 U.S. Const. art. IL § 3, cl. 1. For more analysis, see Calabresi & Rhodes, supra
note 19, at 1207 n.262.
47 U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added). See also id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2
(providing for Senate advice and consent in treaty making and appointments).
See generally Prakash Note, supra note 19 (discussing the President's tremendous
control and discretion as chief administrator).
49 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added). See 2 Farrand, supra note 11, at 53-54
(Gouverneur Morris at Philadelphia convention) ("There must be certain great officers
of State; a minister of finance, of war, of foreign affairs &c. These he presumes will
exercise their functions in subordination to the Executive .... Without these ministers
the Executive can do nothing of consequence."); 1 Annals, supra note 14, at 481
(remarks of James Madison, June 16, 1789) ("if any power whatsoever is in its nature
executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute
the laws.").
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impossibility that one man should be able to perform all the
great business of the State, I take to have been the reason for
instituting the great Departments, and appointing officers
therein, to assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties
of his trust. ' 50 Without the Opinion Clause-and the deep
structural principle it exemplifies-a (bad but plausible)
argument could have been made that Congress could pass laws
preventing Cabinet officers from reporting specially to the
President. It might have been argued that the Article II Vesting
Clause, standing alone, was too vague and open-ended to defeat
this law; and the Take Care Clause by itself could have been
claimed to "beg the question"-the hypothetical No Report Rule
would of course itself purport to be a law that the President
must faithfully execute. Even if Cabinet officials, appointed by
the President, were removable at will (and there was some
ambiguity about this at the Founding5l) a President might be left
in the dark about what was going on in his own administration,
under his own watch.52
Alternatively, consider the implications of the Opinion Clause
if (as some at Founding may have thought) Cabinet officials
were to be removable only for cause-such as defiance of lawful
Presidential orders. Without the Opinion Clause, even if no
Congressional "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" law were on the books,
a Cabinet officer's refusal to brief the President might not have
been obviously unlawful (and thus grounds for dismissal).53
Two other readings of the "President may require" language
are formally possible in light of the expressio unius maxim of
50 30 Writings of George Washington 334 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (emphasis
added); see also 1 Annals, supra note 14, at 492 (remarks of Fisher Ames, June 16,
1789) (Constitution vests "all executive power in the hands of the President, and could
he personally execute all the laws, there would be no occasion for establishing
auxillaries; but the circumscribed powers of... one man, demand the aid of others.");
id. at 637 (remarks of Theodore Sedgwick, June 29, 1789) (executive officers are the
"eyes and arms of the principal Magistrate, the instruments of execution").
51 See, e.g., James Madison, Letter to Edmund Pendleton, in 12 The Papers of James
Madison 251-53 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979) (June 21, 1789
Letter); The Federalist No. 77, at 459-62 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 25-26 & nn.114-15.
52 See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 19, at 1207-08; Prakash Note, supra note 19,
at 1005.




construction.5 4 A superstrong expressio unius reading might
read the clause to imply that only the President-and not
Congress-may demand information from Cabinet officers.55 Of
course the clause does not say this explicitly. This superstrong
reading would run counter to longstanding practice, and to the
explicit role of Congress in considering impeachment of Cabinet
officers under Article I, Sections 2 and 3, and Article II, Section
4.56 A slightly softer, though still strong, expressio unius reading
would likewise deny the general duty of a Cabinet officer to
appear before general Congressional oversight hearings (though
she would be free to appear if she and the President so
desired).57 But, this reading would concede, Congress could
demand information from Cabinet officers if it explicitly and in
good faith invokes its impeachment powers. (Note that, here
too, the Senate would have no role to play until after the House
formally impeaches.) Congress could also perhaps impose
reporting requirements on a Cabinet officer by law-as did the
First Congress, it seems58-but of course this law would require
presentment to, and risk veto by, the President. Obviously, this
strong reading is also in some tension with longstanding practice;
but it illustrates how the clause could be read, in a strongly
unitary-executive way, to limit Parliamentary-style government
via abusive oversight hearings conducted by Congressional
barons who are improperly trying to act as Cabinet officers (or
as President) micro-managing executive department policy.59
54 See supra note 30.
55 See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 19, at 1207; Sidak, supra note 53, at 2086.
56 U.S. Const. art I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment."); id. at § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to
try all Impeachments."); id. at art. II, § 4 ("all civil Officers of the United States, shall
be removed from Office on Impeachment....").
57 The 1879 House Judiciary Committee language, quoted supra text accompanying
note 45, seems to lean in this direction in the phrase "or the action of his officers
against his consent."
58 See Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65, 66 (Richard Peters ed., Little,
Brown 1845). Overlooking the fact of Presidential presentment, Professors Lessig and
Sunstein mistakenly read this Act as reflecting the Framers' belief that "the legislative
branch possessed an inherent authority to demand reports." Lessig & Sunstein, supra
note 3, at 33.
59 See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive,
48 Ark. L. Rev. 23 (1995).
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Though we should not necessarily embrace this strong
expressio unius reading, it does confirm the view that the
Opinion Clause in general supports, rather than undermines, the
idea of a unitary executive.
In the end, the Opinion Clause clearly exemplifies the
President's supervisory power over the executive departments.
But along with this Presidential power-indeed, precisely
because of it-comes Presidential responsibility and
accountability for these departments. Precisely because of his
power to supervise, the buck stops with him. Indeed, as we shall
now see, the Opinion Clause subtly highlights and sharpens the
exact form of executive accountability contemplated by the
Constitution.
V. "RESPECTIVE": THE PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
PRINCIPLE
Strictly speaking the Constitution does not contemplate a
"Cabinet"-a group of department heads meeting as such-but
instead calls for a series of different departments. The Opinion
Clause does not envision the President asking the Secretary of
the Treasury for general advice about the death penalty; or
asking the Attorney General for general advice about interest
rates. Rather the clause envisions the President asking each
officer for advice about her respective assignment.6° Of course
some issues cut across various departments-and so more than
one Cabinet member might be asked to weigh in-but the image
is not one of the Cabinet as a fungible group formulating
executive policy. Instead, the clause conjures up a hub-and-
spoke model, with the President at the hub, each Cabinet officer
as a spoke, and no rim connecting the spokes independent of the
hub.
This model sharply contrasts with the British-style Privy
Council model, a model featured in several early state
constitutions61 and in early proposed drafts of the Federal
Constitution in Philadelphia. The Council model was ultimately
60 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 634; Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 19,
at 1196 n.216.
61 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 610 n.278.
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rejected in favor of the Opinion Clause model, precisely because
the latter better promoted individual accountability at two levels.
First, at the Cabinet level, the Opinion Clause focused
responsibility for triumphs and failures on individual department
heads responsible for their respective departments. Even the
chief proponents of Privy Council models at the Philadelphia
convention sought to tailor the Council to promote individual
accountability for each Council member's particular area of
competence. Thus, Gouverneur Morris and Charles Pinckney
recommended a clause providing that
[t]he President may from time to time submit any matter to the
discussion of the Council of State, and he may require the
written opinions of any one or more of the members: But...
every officer abovementioned shall be responsible for his
opinion on the affairs relating to his particular Department.62
Second, the Opinion Clause, as finally drafted, sharpened
Presidential accountability by emphasizing the hub. The
President could not easily diffuse his own responsibility by
hiding behind a group-the Cabinet. Hear the words of future-
Justice James Iredell in the North Carolina ratifying convention:
[The Opinion Clause] is, in some degree, substituted for a
council.... [but] does not diminish the responsibility of the
President himself.
It has been the opinion of many gentlemen, that the President
should have a council....
... [HIfad he a council by whose advice he was bound to act,
his responsibility, in all such cases, must be destroyed.... [I]t
would be natural for him to say, "You know my council are
men of integrity and ability: I could not act against their
62 2 Farrand, supra note 11, at 343-44 (emphasis added). Earlier, Morris had
emphasized that principal officers, though "exercis[ing] their functions in subordination
to the Executive,... will be amenable by impeachment to the public Justice." Id. at
54. Impeachment of "wicked" advisors of the King had been an important part of the
English Constitution, see 1 Blackstone, supra note 32, at 237, 244; 4 Elliot's Debates,
supra note 11, at 109 (James Iredell at North Carolina ratifying convention).
In a similar vein, Pinckney, during the ratification period, stressed the President's
power to "inspect" the respective executive departments in ways that would "check"
the principal officers, and if necessary provide the means for "punishing" their "mal-
practices," 3 Farrand, supra note 11, at 111.
[Vol. 82:647662
Opinion Clause
opinions, though I confess my own was contrary to theirs."
This, sir, would be pernicious.... It would be difficult often to
know whether the President or counsellors were most to
blame.... [But under the Opinion Clause,] the President will
personally have the credit of good, or the censure of bad
measures; since, though he may ask advice, he is to use his own
judgment in following or rejecting it.63
Iredell had sounded the same themes in an earlier published
pamphlet, where he criticized formal Councils for "screen[ing]"
the chief executive, and stressed that under the Opinion Clause,
"the President must be personally responsible for everything."6 4
The pointed italics were Iredell's.
Though Hamilton slighted the Opinion Clause itself in The
Federalist Papers, earlier in his discussion of the Presidency he
strongly echoed Iredell and emphatically rejected execution by
Cabinet/Committee in favor of a unitary-and thus
accountable-President. In No. 70, entitled "[The Constitution
of the President] in Relation to the Unity of the Executive, with
an Examination of the Project of an Executive Council," 65 he
wrote:
[O]ne of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the executive,
... is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsi-
bility.... It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual
accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the
punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious
measures, ought really to fall....
"I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided
in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better
resolution on the point." These and similar pretexts are
constantly at hand, whether true or false.66
Though Hamilton did not highlight the word "opinions," we
should focus on the word here to see the obvious relevance of
this passage to the Opinion Clause. And so when Hamilton
later dismissed the clause as a "mere redundancy" in No. 74, his
63 4 Elliot's Debates, supra note 11, at 108-10 (emphasis added).
64 Observations on George Mason's Objections to the Federal Constitution, supra
note 11, at 348.
65 The Federalist Papers at xxix (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
66 The Federalist No. 70, at 427-28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (emphasis added) (quotation marks in original).
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quick dismissal occurred because, in effect, he had already
expounded on the spirit of the clause-at length, though not by
name-in No. 70.
Consider also Hamilton's language in two later Federalist
Papers: "[T]he sense of responsibility is always strongest in
proportion as it is undivided, '67 and "The sole and undivided
responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of
duty and a more exact regard to reputation. '68
Oliver Ellsworth, who had participated vigorously in
Philadelphia and would soon play leading roles in both Congress
and the Supreme Court, similarly touched on the Opinion
Clause in the course of an influential essay mocking government
by Cabinet and praising a unitary executive:
The states who have had such councils have found them useless,
and complain of them as a dead weight. In others, as in
England, the supreme executive advises when and with whom
he pleases; if any information is wanted, the heads of the
departments who are always at hand can best give it, and from
the manner of their appointment will be trustworthy. Secrecy,
vigor, dispatch and responsibility, require that the supreme
executive should be one person, and unfettered otherwise than
by the laws he is to execute.69
These views, expressed by Federalist leaders publicly during
the ratification process, closely track the views expressed earlier
by leading Federalists in the Philadelphia convention, which met
behind closed doors. Early on, when the convention made its
momentous decision to vest the executive power in a single
person, James Wilson argued forcefully in favor of a single
magistrate, as "giving most energy dispatch and responsibility to
the office. '70 When asked by Hugh Williamson "whether he
means to annex a Council" to the President, Wilson replied that
he wanted "no Council, which oftener serves to cover, than
prevent malpractices. ' ' 71 James Madison shared Wilson's vision
of a unitary executive, and he too expressed concern that a
67 Id. No. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton).
68 Id. No. 76, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton).
69 The Landholder, VI in Essays, supra note 11, at 163.
70 1 Farrand, supra note 11, at 65.
71 Id. at 97.
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Council might blur Presidential responsibility: "[A]n Executive
formed of one Man would answer the purpose when aided by a
Council, who should have the right to advise and record their
proceedings, but not to control his authority."72  "[A] single
Executive [must be free] to depart from their Opinion at his
peril."73
When Wilson and Madison argued for a Council of Revision
in which the President and judges would collectively wield the
veto, other leading Federalists resisted because they believed
that this, too, might muddy the personal responsibility of a
unitary President. In Rufus King's words: "If the Unity of the
Executive was preferred for the sake of responsibility, the policy
of it is as applicable to the revisionary as to the Executive
power." 74 John Dickinson agreed: "[R]esponsibility is more
[important], which can only be preserved ... by leaving [the
Executive] singly to discharge its functions." 75  Likewise,
Nathaniel Gorham argued that "it would be best to let the
Executive alone be responsible, and at most to authorize him to
call on Judges for their opinions. '76 Wilson and Madison each
countered unsuccessfully that unity was required for true
executive power, but the veto, as a species of legislative power,
was different.77
A few weeks later, Oliver Ellsworth argued that the President
should be provided with "a Council... who should advise but
not conclude the President. s78 In response, Charles Pinckney
emphasized the importance of personal Presidential re-
sponsibility: "[T]he President shd. be authorized to call for
advice or not as he might chuse. Give him an able Council and
it will thwart him; a weak one and he will shelter himself under
their sanction. '79 Pinckney, along with Gouverneur Morris, then
put forth an elaborate "Council of State" proposal under which
the President "shall in all cases exercise his own judgment, and
72 Id. at 74.
73 Id. at 70.
74 Id. at 139.
75 Id. at 140.
76 2 id. at 73.
77 See 1 id. at 140 (Wilson); 2 id. at 77 (Madison).
78 2 id. at 328-29.
79 Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
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either Conform to such opinions or not as he may think
proper."8 0  This proposal went to a drafting committee that
distilled the idea as follows: The President "shall have a Privy-
Council ... whose duty it shall be to advise him in matters
respecting the execution of his Office, which he shall think
proper to lay before them: But their advice shall not conclude
him, nor affect his responsibility for the measures which he shall
adopt."' The convention never adopted this proposal. Instead
the members sent it back to yet another committee for
reconsideration.82 That committee--on which Morris sat-sub-
stituted the Opinion Clause for the Council proposal8 3 precisely
because it was felt that, by its very nature as a collective body,
a Council might end up blurring the personal responsibility of a
unitary President. As Morris explained to his fellow delegates,
"The question of a Council was considered in the Committee,
where it was judged that the Presidt. by persuading his
Council-to concur in his wrong measures, would acquire their
[i.e., the Council's] protection for them [i.e., the measures]."84
This legislative history shows that the Opinion Clause sharply
rejected English- and state-style Privy Councils precisely to
strengthen the idea of a unitary executive with personal
responsibility. Interpretations-like Michael Froomkin's, Larry
Lessig's and Cass Sunstein's-that read the clause to oppose a
unitary executive turn all this history upside down. 5
VI. "THE PRINCIPAL OFFICER": THE ExECUTvE PYRAMID
(INNER CIRCLE) PRINCIPLE
Why does the Opinion Clause speak only of principal officers?
One strong expressio unius reading86 would be that the President
has no right to require reports from sub-Cabinet "inferior"
80 Id. at 343-44 (emphasis added).
81 Id. at 367 (emphasis added).
82 Id. at 481.
83 Id. at 495.
84 Id. at 542.
85 For other correctives, see Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 628-31; David I.
Lewittes, Constitutional Separation of War Powers: Protecting Public and Private
Liberty, 57 Brook. L. Rev. 1083, 1124-30 (1992); Prakash Note, supra note 19, at 1005-
07.
8 See supra note 30.
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officers in the Executive Branch. Of course, the Opinion Clause
does not quite say that. Ordinarily, by the logic of transitivity,
if the President can command principal officers, and principal
officers can command inferiors, then Presidential power over
inferiors should follow a fortiori. There is an obvious analogy
here to the military chain of command under the logic of the
Commander-in-Chief Clause-an analogy strengthened by the
fact that this chain-of-command clause immediately precedes the
Opinion Clause.
A better reading of tie "principal Officer" language is that it
exemplifies the Founders' expectation that the President will
ordinarily directly pick, act through, and monitor only a handful
of personal lieutenants-his inner circle.87  As Hamilton
observed in The Federalist No. 72, department heads "ought to
be considered as the assistants or deputies of the Chief
Magistrate, and on this account they ought to derive their offices
from his appointment, at least from his nomination, and ought
to be subject to his superintendence. 88 Although the apex of an
awesome pyramid ultimately rests on a broad and vast base, it
sits immediately atop a small top ring. While the President is
ultimately responsible for all that happens in his administration
under his watch, the Opinion Clause reminds us that we should
not necessarily tax the President with personal responsibility for
all misdeeds by minor officials, because the President ordinarily
does not directly select and oversee them. Though ultimately
inferior to the President, they report directly to principal officers
(or the principals' underlings).
This reading of the Opinion Clause also casts light on the
Appointment Clause-the other main clause dealing directly
8 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
88 The Federalist No. 72, at 436 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See also 2 Farrand, supra note 11, at 342 (Morris and Pinckney proposal that
department heads should "assist the President in conducting the Public affairs")
(emphasis added). Precisely because of the close relationship between a President and
his chief lieutenants in the Cabinet, these officers-and not, say, the Speaker of the
House-should stand first (after the Vice President) in the line of Presidential
succession. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential
Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 113 (1995); see also Steven G.
Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 155
(1995) (agreeing that Congress should adopt a Cabinet succession plan, but noting that
any Congressional succession statute would be unreviewable as a political question).
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with Cabinet officers (here, relabeled heads of departments).8 9
For inferior officers, Congress can vest appointment in the
President himself or in a principal officer/department head. If
the appointment is vested in the President, there is more obvious
direct Presidential control-and personal responsibility. If,
instead, the appointment is vested in a principal officer, that
officer bears more personal responsibility. 90 In either case, the
inferior officer reports to, and must be countermandable by, the
appointing officer himself. An "inferior" officer thus embodies
a relational concept. An "inferior" officer is not merely less than
another (as two is less than three and a GS-13 Deputy Assistant
Attorney General is less than a GS-16 Secretary of State), but
also inferior to another (as an Assistant Attorney General is
inferior to the General whom the Assistant assists). This
reading of "inferior" comports with its usage in the inferior
courts clause of Article I, Section 8-lower federal courts are
"inferior to" the Supreme Court.91 Indeed, this reading explains
why these courts may generally be reviewed and reversed by the
89 U.S. Const. art II, § 2, cl. 2 ("Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments."). Note that in their 1793 correspondence, Chief
Justice Jay and his brethren used the phrase "heads of departments" rather than
"principal Officer[s]" in paraphrasing the Opinion Clause. See supra text accom-
panying note 43. And so did Oliver Ellsworth in an influential ratification pamphlet.
See supra text accompanying note 69. Professors Lessig and Sunstein suggest that
"Heads of [non-executive] Departments" may exist who are not the same as "principal
Officer[s]" of "executive Departments". See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 35-38.
There is strong reason to doubt their provocative suggestion, see Calabresi & Prakash,
supra note 4, at 626-34 & n.393, 647-54.
90 Thus, it is not the case that, if department heads really are Presidential assistants
and deputies, there is no difference between Presidential and department head
appointment. Contra Froomkin Note, supra note 3, at 799 (unitary-executive reading
renders department head appointment, in contradistinction to Presidential
appointment, "meaningless"); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 35 (similar). The
difference is one of personal responsibility for the appointment. This might seem a
trivial difference to us, but it would not have been to some founders, see infra notes
94,99. (And of course, we should remember that the Department Head Appointment
Clause was a last-minute, housekeeping item, see Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 19,
at 1168) (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 720 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
91 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (emphasis added). See also id. at art. III, § 1 (vesting
judicial power in "one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.").
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Supreme Court and why they must generally follow that high
court's precedents. 92
Justice Scalia's forceful dissent in Morrison v. Olson93 strongly
hints at, without quite driving home, this reading of the
Appointment Clause. On this reading, a court can appoint only
officers inferior to it-such as magistrates or law clerks-whose
every decision may be monitored and countermanded by the
appointing authority. A fortiori, interbranch appointments are
ruled out by the relational word "inferior": a special prosecutor
claiming to be an inferior prosecutor must be appointed by a
superior prosecutor-the Attorney General, and not a
court-who has the power to oversee and monitor the inferior's
prosecutorial performance, and who thus can be held personally
accountable for the inferior's performance. 94
The particular delicacy that attends some special
prosecutors-such as those appointed to investigate the
President himself or his inner circle-might warrant, however, a
narrow law that sought to regulate or ban direct, private, ex
parte communications between the "inferior" special prosecutor
and the President himself, in light of possible conflict-of-
interest/self-dealing concerns. Although Congress may not
92 See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817, 828-37 (1994). The argument Caminker sets forth
here usefully corrects the analysis in Amar, supra note 21, at 258 n.170, subject to the
following refinement: If an inferior court has good reason to believe that its
"superior," the Supreme Court, would itself overrule an old Supreme Court case, but
cannot do so because it now lacks appellate jurisdiction, a faithful "inferior" court
could-must?-disregard the old precedent on behalf of its superior.
93 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 715-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's view echoes
that of Judge Skelly Wright, who offered a "naturalo" and "common-sense reading"
of the Appointment Clause that "courts of law and the other listed offices were meant
to appoint only those officers 'inferior' to them.... [This] reading harmonizes with the
most apparent purpose of Article II: to let Congress clothe Secretaries and courts with
the necessary authority for filling vacancies in their own staffs." Hobson v. Hansen,
265 F. Supp. 902, 921 (D.D.C. 1967) (Wright, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See
also Ex parte Hennen, 38 U. S. (13 Pet.) 230, 257-58 (1839) (similar).
940n the importance of personal accountability in the appointments context, see The
Federalist No. 76, at 455-56 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(quoted supra text accompanying note 68); id. No. 77, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton)
("The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the President singly and
absolutely"). My understanding of this issue has profited from the insights developed
in Stephen P. Vaughn's outstanding unpublished manuscript, "Bringing Responsibility
to the Appointments Clause" (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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generally interfere with the President's ability to communicate
with low-level executive officers, arguably it can do so in some
rare instances-deriving modest support, perhaps, from the
negative implications95 of the words "principal Officer."
VII. "IN WRITING": TIE PROBITY AND PUBLICITY PRINCIPLES
What if the President simply tried to squeeze confidential
investigation information out of the "inferior" prosecutor's
constitutionally proper supervisor, the Attorney General?
Consider the intriguing implications of the Opinion Clause's
cryptic aside, "in writing." A strong expressio unius reading96
might suggest that the President generally has no right to
demand oral information from his Cabinet Secretaries and that
Congress could lawfully ban all such ex parte exchanges. Of
course, the clause does not quite say this. Ordinarily, it would
be silly-and violative of the spirit of a smoothly functioning
executive pyramid-to bar such exchanges.
According to the Supreme Court in the Nixon tapes case:
[There is a] valid need for protection of communications
between high Government officials and those who advise and
assist them in the performance of their manifold duties; the
importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require further
discussion. Human experience teaches that those who expect
public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor
with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to
the detriment of the decisionmaking process.
[ T]he public interest [requires] candid, objective, and even
blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking. A
President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to
express except privately.97
A more narrow reading might suggest that, in some unusual
circumstances, a Cabinet officer might be right in demanding the
formality of a written exchange and in resisting an ex parte oral
9 See supra note 30.
9 See supra note 30.
9 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705, 708 (1974).
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briefing. Although a President can fire an Attorney General for
any reason or no reason, Janet Reno would not be betraying her
oath or defying the Constitution if she declined to brief Clinton
privately on the Whitewater investigation. She must be prepared
to brief him in writing if asked-this is what the clause
requires-but then there will be a permanent record of the
briefing, lest anyone later wonder whether inappropriate
information was given by the General,9" or an inappropriate
request was made by the President. 99
Indeed, taking the argument one step further, perhaps
Congress could lawfully require that certain Cabinet-Presidential
communications about matters involving Presidential conflicts of
interest occur only in writing. Thus, although Congress cannot
forbid all oral exchanges, perhaps it could ban some. This idea
is hinted at in the cryptic aside "in writing"O-for the framing
generation no doubt felt that men (and today women) would be
more likely to do dishonorable things in private than in public
with written records. As James Iredell explained in the North
Carolina ratifying convention: "[T]he necessity of their opinions
being in writing, will render them more cautious in giving them,
and make them responsible should they give advice manifestly
improper.... [The opinion process] is plain and open."' 01 This
oral ode to writing echoed what Iredell had already said-in
writing!-in a widely respected pamphlet: "[A written opinion]
must for ever afterwards speak for itself, and commit the
98 Note the military, chain-of-command metaphor here. See supra Part VI.
99 Even if this written report could not be demanded at will by a single House of
Congress, see supra text accompanying notes 54-59, it might be subject to subpoena
in a bona fide impeachment investigation of either the President or the department
head. And of course, a President might, as a political matter, be forced to
"voluntarily" share the document with Congress as the price for getting Congress to
do something else the President wants done. Finally, the document might be available
to historians years later-and both President and Cabinet heads, as lovers of "fame,"
could be expected to care about their enduring reputations and the judgment of
history, see Douglass Adair, Fame and the Founding Fathers, in Fame and the
Founding Fathers 3 (Trevor Colbourn ed., 1974); The Federalist No. 72, at 437
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("love of fame [is] the ruling
passion of the noblest minds"); infra text accompanying notes 101-102.
100 In Philadelphia, the idea of written opinions was hinted at early on, when James
Madison proposed that an Executive Council be given the right to "advise and record
their proceedings." 1 Farrand, supra note 11, at 74 (emphasis added).
101 4 Elliot's Debates, supra note 11, at 108-10.
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character of the writer, in lasting colors, either of fame or
infamy, or neutral insignificance, to future ages, as well as the
present."10
Other provisions of the Constitution push in the same
direction. When the President vetoes a bill, he must under
Article I, Section 7 openly state his objections,103 which are then
entered on the presumptively public journal of the originating
House.104 And on the override vote, "the Names of the Persons
voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of
each House respectively.' ' 05 On other votes, Article I, Section
5 likewise gives a mere one-fifth of a House the right to demand
a written record of the yeas and nays.1°6
VIII. "THE OPINION... UPON ANY SUBJECT': THE ExECuTIVE
DISCRETION PRINCIPLE
Though he wields awesome powers, the President may not
simply do as he pleases. He must act under law. 07 He must
enforce the Constitution, even where he disagrees with it. So
too, when Congress passes constitutionally proper laws, the
President must execute them, even where he disagrees with
those laws. Yet virtually no law specifies everything: almost all
laws create zones of discretion, zones in which faithful execution
requires good faith judgment and choice. 08 Moreover, even
when the law is clear, the facts in any given situation may be less
so; reasonable persons may disagree about what the facts are
and what the facts mean. Here too, faithful execution will often
require the Executive to exercise good faith judgment and
choice. Furthermore, beyond legal and factual judgment lies
policy judgment: Article II explicitly. invites the President to
102 Observations on George Mason's Objections to the Federal Constitution, supra
note 11, at 348.
103 U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; supra text accompanying note 47.
104 See U.S. Const. art I, § 5, cl. 3.
105 Id. at art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
106 Id. at art. I, § 5, cl. 3; see also id. at art. III, § 3 (calling for treason confessions
"in open Court"); id. at amend. VI (affirming right of "public trial" in all criminal
cases).
107 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 569 n.108.
108 See 2 Farrand, supra note 11, at 34 (remarks of James Madison at Philadelphia
convention) ("in the administration of the [Executive department] much greater
latitude is left to opinion and discretion than in the administration of the [Judiciary]").
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assemble information he deems appropriate to communicate to
Congress in "State of the Union" messages and to give Congress
policy recommendations that "he shall judge necessary and
expedient."'09 Similarly, Article I gives the President a huge
role, via the veto, in fashioning new policy.1 0
In performing all of these tasks, and in exercising all of these
kinds of discretion, the President necessarily relies on
others-most critically, his inner circle of principal officers-to
lend him their eyes and ears and hearts and minds. The
Opinion Clause phrase "Opinion... upon any Subject" captures
the breadth of Executive Branch discretion and judgment. The
President is responsible for following and often construing (in
the first instance) the law, for finding (at least in the first
instance) the facts, for exercising limited discretion in executing
existing laws, and for articulating wide-ranging policy judgment
in proposing new laws. On all of these subjects he may demand
the opinion of the relevant Cabinet head(s). If he is dissatisfied
with them on any of these grounds-their legal judgment, their
factual astuteness, their discretionary judgment, their policy
109 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added). For a study of the Recommendation
Clause, see generally Sidak, supra note 53 (offering a historical and economic rationale
for the clause and arguing that "muzzling laws" are an unconstitutional violation of
the President's powers and duties).
110 The Framers understood that, in weighing and wielding his veto pen, the
President would often seek the "information and opinions" of the executive
underlings, see 2 Farrand, supra note 11, at 80 (remarks of John Rutledge at
Philadelphia convention); see also 2 Elliot's Debates, supra note 11, at 448 (similar
remarks of James Wilson at Pennsylvania ratifying convention). One of the first and
most memorable uses of the Opinion Clause occurred when President Washington
asked for opinions from Cabinet officers Hamilton, Jefferson and Randolph, as he
pondered a possible veto of the Bank Bill. See Michael B. Rappaport, The President's
Veto and the Constitution, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 735, 782-83 & nn.189-90 (1993). In his
classic decision in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall not only relied on Hamilton's
written opinion throughout the case, but also opened with a pointed reference to
Washington's decision to solicit the views of his "executive cabinet" before making up
his own "pure and intelligent" "mindo." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 402 (1819). Note that, contrary to Lessig and Sunstein's provocative claims,
Hamilton clearly understood in this incident that he was an executive officer subject
to President Washington's order under the Opinion Clause, see Calabresi & Prakash,
supra note 4, at 651. This was also Washington's understanding, see id., and
Marshall's too. (Note Marshall's explicit reference to Washington's "executive
cabinet." McCulloch, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) at 402.) The First Congress shared this
view; nine days after creating the Treasury Department Congress passed a "Salary
Act" describing the Treasury Secretary as an "Executive Officer," see id. at 647-48.
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wisdom-he may dismiss them."' Precisely because of this
broad power to oversee and, where necessary, thwart his
Cabinet, the President is visibly accountable to the American
People for all these aspects of his administration.
Perhaps no one put it better than the great Federalist leader
James Wilson, one of the earliest champions at Philadelphia of
a unitary executive. In the Pennsylvania ratifying convention
debates he declared: "The next good quality ... is, that the
executive authority is one.... The executive power is better to
be trusted when it has no screen. Sir, we have a responsibility
in the person of our President .... ,,112 Three years later, in his
celebrated Lectures on Law, Wilson returned to this basic
theme. Though he did not refer to the Opinion Clause by name,
he clearly expounded its spirit by explaining at length how the
American Chief Executive differed from his English antecedent:
In one important particular-the unity of the executive
power-the constitution of the United States stands on an equal
footing with that of Great Britain. In one respect, the provision
is much more efficacious.
The British throne is surrounded by counsellors. With regard
to their authority, a profound and mysterious silence is
observed. One effect, we know, they produce; and we conceive
it to be a very pernicious one. Between power and
responsibility, they interpose an impenetrable barrier. Who
possesses the executive power? The king. When its baneful
emanations fly over the land; who are responsible for the
mischief? His ministers. Amidst their multitude, and the
secrecy, with which business, especially that of a perilous kind,
is transacted, it will be often difficult to select the culprits; still
more so, to punish them. The criminality will be diffused and
blended with so much variety and intricacy, that it will be
almost impossible to ascertain to how many it extends, and what
particular share should be assigned to each.
In the United States, our first executive magistrate is not
obnubilated behind the mysterious obscurity of counsellors.
111 See 1 Annals, supra note 14, at 480 (remarks of James Madison, June 16, 1789)
("the first Magistrate should be responsible for the executive department; so far
therefore as we do not make the officers who are to aid him in the duties of that
department responsible to him, he is not responsible to his country.").
112 2 Elliot's Debates, supra note 11, at 480.
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Power is communicated to him with liberality, though with
ascertained limitations. To him the provident or improvident
use of it is to be ascribed. For the first, he will have and
deserve undivided applause. For the last, he will be subjected
to censure; if necessary, to punishment. He is the dignified, but
accountable magistrate of a free and great people." 3
113 1 The Works of James Wilson 318-19 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967).
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